Practical Zero-Trust for Mission-Critical Robotic Fleets via Hardware Attestation and Packet Timing Watermarking

Engineering notes

Engineering notes will be added by the Robot Papers editorial team.

Chinese explanation / 中文解读

中文解读待补充：本站会优先为 VLA、具身智能、人形机器人控制、机器人操作等高价值论文补充中文说明。

Original abstract

Autonomous unmanned vehicles are vital to tactical missions, mission-critical public-safety operations like search and rescue and disaster response. However, their reliance on open wireless links and standard Robot Operating System (ROS 2) middleware exposes a broad cyber-physical attack surface. A compromise of these systems can disrupt real-time control loops, leading to mission failure or asset loss in high-stakes environments. This paper presents and empirically evaluates a layered, context-aware cybersecurity framework enforcing Zero-Trust principles for a multi-node robotic fleet over Wi-Fi. The framework integrates an active hardware root of trust (TPM 2.0), centralized in-band and out-of-band SIEM telemetry monitoring (ELK Stack and Kismet), and a non-cryptographic Inter-Packet Delay (IPD) timing watermark. Evaluated on a live ROS 2 mobile testbed under multi-layer exploits (OSI Layers 2-5), results demonstrate that while volume-based filters isolate brute denial-of-service floods, tracking the statistical sample kurtosis (K) of the embedded IPD watermark exposes stealthy Man-in-the-Middle command injections with complete detection accuracy without payload overheads.

Links and sources

• Official / arXiv page
• PDF from original source

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